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Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court granted Mulcahy's motion and ordered any evidence obtained as a 
result of the illegal search and seizure be suppressed and not allowed as evidence in the 
case. 
Statement of the Facts. 
1. On April 7, 1996, at approximately 6:00 a.m., DeWayne Olsen ("Olsen") 
heard a car pull into his driveway. He observed an individual walk across the front of his 
yard to his front porch. The individual rang his door bell. Olsen did not answer the 
door but placed a 911 telephone call to report a suspected "drunk individual" on his 
doorstep. When Olsen failed to answer the door, the individual returned to his car and 
drove away. [R. at 77-SO, S6-9]. 
2. The dispatcher asked Olsen if he knew who the individual was, and Olsen 
responded, "I can guess who he is, but I don't want to deal with him." Olsen did not 
identify the individual to the dispatcher. [R. at 78]. 
3. Olsen told the dispatcher the individual was in a " white car... [a]...Toyota 
Celica, maybe." [R. at "9 j . The dispatch radioed officers the "suspect's in a white 
Toyota." [R. at 79]. 
4. Olsen did not know the type of vehicle Mulcahy drove and could not tie 
Mulcahy to the white car parked in his driveway. [R. 92]. 
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5. Mulcahy had been to the Olsen home on numerous occasions and had 
dated Olsen's daughter. [R. at 73]. Olsen could have provided the dispatcher with 
Mulcahy's description, however, Olsen was unable to identify Mulcahy as the individual 
on his door step and he did not describe Mulcahy to the dispatcher. [R. at 86-7]. 
6. Olsen did not tell the dispatcher that he observed the individual walk in 
an impaired fashion, nor did he report the individual to be driving in an uncontrolled or 
erratic manner. [R. at 55, 89] 
7 . A patrol car was dispatched to Olsen's address, however the individual left 
Olsen's home before an officer arrived. [R. 79]. 
8. Officer Darin J. Heslop ("Officer Heslop") was going off duty at 
approximately 6:00 a.m. on the morning of April 7, 1996 when he overheard a dispatch 
to any unit in the Kaysville area. [R. 94]. 
9. The Officer responded to the dispatch and was heading northbound on 
Main Street in Kaysville when he observed a vehicle's headlights coming towards him. 
[R.95]. 
10. As Officer Heslop passed the southbound vehicle, he noticed the vehicle 
was white. There were no other moving cars on the road at the time. Officer Heslop 
turned and stopped the white vehicle. [R. 96]. 
11. Officer Heslop did not notice the make of the vehicle. [R.102]. 
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12. Officer Heslop stopped the vehicle because it was in the area of 
information received from dispatch, the car was white and there were no other vehicles 
on the road. [R. 102]. 
13. Officer Heslop did not observe any crime being committed by the driver of 
the white car. [R. 103]. 
14. Mulcahy was driving a Mazda, not a Toyota, at the time he was stopped 
by Officer Heslop. [R. 3]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is irrelevant whether Olsen had a reasonable suspicion based on articulable 
facts that the man on his doorstep on April 7, 1996 was Mulcahy, or that Mulcahy was 
intoxicated because Olsen had an insufficient basis for his belief. See, Brief of the 
Appellant, p 8. The relevant inquiry here is whether law enforcement officers had a 
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the driver of the white vehicle 
stopped in Kaysville City on the morning of April 7, 1996 was committing or had 
committed a crime. 
The trial court reviewed the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing and concluded the dispatcher did not have knowledge of articulable facts to 
create a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was committing a 
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crime. The trial court's factual findings are supported by evidence in the record and 
the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the trial court's findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light 
most favorable to the decision. Therefore, the trial court's findings are not clearly 
erroneous and should not be disturbed. 
ARGUMENT 
TO STOP AND DETAIN A CITIZEN FOR INVESTIGATIVE 
PURPOSES, POLICE MUST FIRST ARTICULATE KNOWLEDGE 
OF OBJECTIVE FACTS SETTING FORTH A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION THAT A CRIME HAS BEEN OR IS BEING COMMITTED. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1§ 14 of 
the Utah Constitution provide: "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated." Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a "seizure" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention quite brief. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 
59 L.Ed 2d 660 (1979). Accord State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1992). 
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1988, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (seizure 
occurs whenever officer stops an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away). 
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For purposes of constitutional analysis, a traffic stop is characterized as an investigative 
detention rather than a custodial arrest. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 
786 (10th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2529 (1996). 
An investigative detention must be based upon "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion/" United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1038 (10th Cir. 1996) quoting Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968). To justify the stop, the detaining officer must have a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the detainee has been, is, or is about to be engaged 
in criminal activity. United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 987 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Accord, State v. Case, 884 P.2d at 1277, citing UCA J 77-7-15 (1990); State v. Carpena, 
714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (reasonable suspicion must be based on 
objective facts indicating criminal activity). 
The required level of suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable 
cause to arrest, however, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used 
to determine whether there are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support 
reasonable suspicion. Case, 884 P.2d at 1277. (Citations omitted). If the investigating 
officer cannot provide independent or corroborating information through his or her own 
observations, the legality of a stop based on information imparted by another will 
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depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the individual originating 
the information subsequently received and acted upon by the investigating officer. 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 676, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (stop in 
reliance upon bulletin issued in absence of reasonable suspicion violates Fourth 
Amendment). Accord, Case, 884 P.2d at 1277, 1279 (citing, United States v. Ornelas-
Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1994) (uncorroborated tip by itself does not justify 
stop, even if tip comes from law enforcement); In re Eskiel S., 15 Cal. App. 4th 1638, 19 
Cal. Rptr 2d 455,458 (1993) (record devoid of evidence showing officer who originated 
report had reasonable suspicion); (citations omitted)). The State bears the burden to 
show the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion necessary to support the 
stop. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994). 
In reviewing a trial court's determination whether reasonable suspicion justifies a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, the appellate court applies two different standards of 
review: one to the trial court's factual findings and the other to its legal conclusions. 
State v. Casey 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994). The trial court's factual findings 
underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are examined for 
clear error. Id. citing State v. Penay 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The appellant 
must demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's 
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findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision. Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 1992). 
The standard to be applied to the court's conclusion of law - whether the facts 
give rise to reasonable suspicion, "is reviewable ... for correctness..." Id. The nature of 
the determination of law, nonetheless, allows the trial court "a measure of discretion... 
when applying that standard to a given set of facts." Id. 
Officer Heslop testified he did not observe Mulcahy commit any offense. The 
constitutionality of Mulcahy's seizure, therefore, turns on whether the dispatcher had 
knowledge of articulable facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that a crime 
had been committed. The evidence is that dispatch was notified that an individual 
was on Olsen's door step ringing his door bell. The individual did nothing more than 
park his car in Olsen's driveway, walk to Olsen's porch, and ring Olsen's doorbell several 
times. The individual did not linger on the doorstep when Olsen refused to answer, but 
simply returned to his vehicle and drove up the street. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THE RADIO DISPATCHER DID NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE 
OF FACTS CREATING A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
MULCAHY HAD COMMITTED OR WAS COMMITTING 
A CRIME. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 provides, 
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A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation. 
(Emphasis added). Officer Heslop could stop Mulcahy if the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion Mulcahy had committed or was committing a crime. The testimony, 
however, established that the officer did not observe Mulcahy committing a crime. The 
investigative stop, nonetheless, "may survive the constitutional prohibitions of 
unreasonable searches and seizures if the officer relied upon. . . a bulletin" received from 
other law enforcement sources. State v. Case, 854 P.2d at 1277, citing United States v. 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (investigating 
officer may rely on a bulletin to justify an investigative stop, but only if the police who 
issued the bulletin possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop); (citations 
omitted). 
In State v. Roth, the driver was arrested for DUI after his vehicle was stopped by a 
University of Utah police officer. 827 P.2d 244 (Utah App. 1992). The stop was made 
on the basis of a police dispatch reporting a drunk driver, as well as the officer's 
independent observations. Prior to the arrest, emergency room personnel at the 
University Hospital observed Roth and noticed his eyes were glazed, his speech was 
slurred, he smelled "strongly" of alcohol and he had trouble standing. Based upon those 
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observations, they concluded Roth was intoxicated and he was asked to leave the 
hospital. University personnel then watched Roth as he tried to drive away in his car. 
Roth repeatedly started the vehicle, stalled, and then jerked to a stop. A University 
officer then asked another security officer to call police dispatch. Dispatch was provided 
with the make and model of the driver's vehicle, as well as the license number. 
When police arrived at the hospital, one of the officers saw a car matching the 
make and model of the vehicle reported, and matched the plate number. The officer 
followed behind the driver and independently observed Roth to be "having a hard time 
driving" and driving "slow and jerky." As a result of the dispatch as well as the officer's 
independent observations, Roth was stopped and he was subsequently arrested for DUI. 
Roth filed a motion to suppress arguing that the arresting officer did not have the 
requisite suspicion to support the stop. The trial court found that the dispatch from 
the security office sustained the necessary reasonable suspicion and denied Roth's 
motion. Id. at 256. 
In the instant case, trial court determined the only way reasonable suspicion can 
be imputed to Officer Heslop is through the dispatcher's knowledge because the officer 
did not have independent personal knowledge of facts to support reasonable suspicion. 
After an objective review of the evidence, trial court found Olsen did not articulate any 
facts to the dispatcher which would indicate a crime was being committed. According 
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to the court, 
He [Olsen] only said, "I have a drunken individual on my doorstep ringing 
my door bell." He told absolutely nothing to the dispatcher which would 
support his opinion that the individual was drunk. He didn't know who 
the individual was, did not talk to him, and made no observations as to 
poor balance or bad driving or the physical condition of the individual. 
[R.at56]. 
The trial court's conclusion the dispatcher, and therefore, Officer Heslop, did not 
have a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts to believe a crime was or had 
been committed was based upon the following facts: 
1. If the dispatcher received information or facts that would support 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had or was committing an offense, it would all 
have to have been communicated to the dispatcher by the complainant, Olsen. [R. 55]. 
2. The testimony and evidence elicited at the hearing showed that Olsen 
told the dispatcher: "I have a drunken individual on my doorstep, ringing my door bell." 
[R. 55, 77-8] 
3. Olsen reported the individual to be "getting into a white car in my 
driveway. Maybe a Toyota Celica...and he is driving off...." [R. 56, 79]. 
4. Olsen told absolutely nothing to the dispatcher which would support his 
opinion that the individual was drunk. [R. 56]. 
5. Olsen didn't know who the individual was, did not talk to him, and he 
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made no observations as to poor balance or bad driving or to the physical condition of 
the individual. [R. 56,89]. 
Based upon these facts, the trial court found the dispatcher did not have 
knowledge of any facts creating a reasonable suspicion the defendant had committed or 
was committing an offense. [R. 56]. When the officer stopped and seized the 
defendant in response to the dispatch which had been issued in absence of articulated 
facts setting forth reasonable suspicion, said stop constituted an unreasonable search 
and seizure in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections under the 
United States Constitution and under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Id. 
Unlike the witnesses in Roth, Olsen neither smelled an odor of alcohol, observed 
any physical incapacities or signs of inebriation, nor did he observe any erratic driving 
behavior. Olsen did not inform the dispatcher of the make, model and license number 
of the vehicle parked in his drive way. Unlike the dispatch in Roth which informed 
officers of a drunk driver, not the mere possibility of a drunk driver, officers in the 
instant case were dispatched to investigate an individual "believed" to be drunk. 
Unlike the officer in Roth7 Officer Heslop did not follow Mulcahy and observe any 
driving pattern which would indicate Mulcahy was incapable of safely operating his car. 
Consequently, no specific facts support reasonable suspicion to prompt the dispatch 
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and permit the dispatcher's knowledge to be imputed to Officer Heslop. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Despite the absence of any evidence Officer Heslop had contact with Olsen prior 
to his stop of Mulcahy, Appellant nonetheless argues Olsen had knowledge of 
infomiation of facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Mulcahy was committing, or 
had committed a crime, therefore, the necessary reasonable suspicion may be imputed 
to the officer. The Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 simply do not permit such a 
hollow transition. See e.g., Hensley, 459 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. at 682 (bulletins may 
justify investigative stop but only if police who issued bulletin possesses reasonable 
suspicion justifying stop). The bridge of reasonable suspicion that permits limited 
government intrusion into the privacy of a citizen may span from one law enforcement 
officer to another, or from a citizen (e.g., an informant) to law enforcement, but the toll 
to the government for crossing that bridge is knowledge: The government must have 
knowledge of articulable facts which support a reasonable suspicion that the intrusion is 
warranted. In this case, the government simply failed to elicit any evidence that the 
radio dispatcher had reasonable suspicion justifying the stop when she issued the 
dispatch precipitating the illegal seizure of Mulcahy on April 7, 1996. 
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Even if Fourth Amendment jurisprudence were so empty as to permit an officer 
to stop an individual based solely upon the reasonable suspicion of a citizen, 
Appellant's argument is flawed because Olsen had nothing more than a belief Mulcahy 
was the individual on his door step and Olsen had nothing more than a belief Mulcahy 
was intoxicated. An unparticularized suspicion or hunch cannot create circumstances 
giving rise to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th 
Cir. 1994); Accord, State v. hello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994) (court has 
consistently refused to sanction intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based upon nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches. Citing, State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App.1987) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 
The trial court, having heard testimony and received evidence on Mulcahy's 
motion to suppress, made the following findings of fact: 
1. Officer Heslop did not observe the defendant committing or attempting , 
to commit a public offense. [R. at 55]. 
2. If the dispatcher received information or facts that would support 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had or was committing an offense, it would all 
have to have been communicated to the dispatcher by Olsen. [R. at 55]. 
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3. Olsen had only a hunch that the individual on his door step was the 
defendant and that Olsen only thought the defendant was intoxicated. [R. at 56]. 
4. Olsen did not articulate any facts to the dispatcher which would support 
an opinion that the individual was drunk. He didn't know who the individual was, did 
not talk to him, and made no observations as to poor balance or bad driving or the 
physical condition of the individual. [R. at 56]. 
Olsen could not identify the individual on his door step as Mulcahy, [R. at 86] 
therefore, Olsen could not link the earlier phone calls to the individual on his porch; 
Although Mulcahy had been to the Olsen home on several occasions, Olsen had not 
seen the white car before and could not tie Mulcahy to the vehicle, [R. at 92]; Olsen did 
not speak with the individual on his door step, therefore, he did not detect an odor of 
alcohol, [R. at 77-79]; Olsen did not report any observations to support his assertion the 
individual on his door step was intoxicated. [R. at 87-89]. In the absence of articulable 
facts that the driver has a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than .08 and the driver 
is incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, mere unsupported beliefs do not, 
contrary to the appellant, meet the elements of the offense of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. 
Olsen did not report that the individual on his door step was illegally on the 
premises, only that he did not want to deal with him. From the evidence, it is clear that 
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rather than commit a criminal trespass, someone pulled into Olsen's driveway, walked 
to Olsen's porch and rang the door bell, returned to the car when no one answered the 
door, and then drove up the street. Appellant's argument that the individual could have 
been committing a trespass can only be considered grasping at straws for any basis to 
justify the officer's illegal conduct. 
Regardless of Olsen's testimony that he was reasonably sure the individual on his 
doorstep was Mulcahy, such evidence is insufficient to justify a stop to investigate a 
completed telephone harassment offense, a misdemeanor. Police did not have a 
reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts that the driver of the 
white Mazda was involved in telephoning and harassing Olsen. The State's attempt 
to justify the stop on grounds of investigation of a trespass, intoxication or telephone 
harassment are inadequate to warrant a determination that the trial court's findings 
were clearly erroneous. The evidence is not legally insufficient to support the findings 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision: To the contrary, the 
evidence overwhelming!) supports the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded the radio dispatcher did not have knowledge 
of articulable facts to create a reasonable suspicion that Mulcahy had committed or was 
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committing a crime, therefore, reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure cannot be 
imputed to Officer Heslop. In addition, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's findings when viewing the 
evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. Therefore, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision granting defendant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 1997. 
GFJpLEY WARD HAVAS SHAW & THOMAS 
( 
Sharon S. Sipes 
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